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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of trust-based relations on 
firm’s performance in transition economies. The trade credit variable is used as 
a proxy of trust-based relations and the propensity score matching method is 
employed to establish casual link between relational governance and business 
performance in the study. The research is conducted using data from a large 
survey of firms across 28 transition economies. The results of the study suggest 
that informal trust-based institutions of contract governance represent an 
important way for enhancing of business performance. To say distinctly, our 
findings indicate that in transition economies trade credits positively affect 
firms’ sales growth. They provide incentives for more intensive innovation 
activities and ensure higher labor productivity rates. The firms that trust their 
partners are characterized by larger proportions of reinvested profits as well.  
The main contribution of this paper is that it provides new empirical insights 
into the casual link between trust-based relations and business performance of 
firms in transition economies. 
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1. Introduction. 
The experience of transition economies shows that one of the key issues in the process of a 
market transformation of centrally-planned system is a creation of consistent and reliable 
institutional framework (World Bank, 2001; World Bank, 2002).  The importance of the proper 
institutional framework for economic development stems from its ability to shape incentive 
structure of economic agents, which influences their investment and innovation decisions 
(Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). According to North (1990), the existing difference 
in economic development levels among countries can be explained by the differences in an 
institutional environment, which involves both formal and informal rules of governing of a 
market economy. The lack of such institutions results in various types of market frictions, 
which hamper productive performance of firms in transition.  In particular, market frictions 
such as the shortage of market information about partners and improper legal system of 
contract enforcement have a substantial impact on the efficiency of inter-firm relations 
(McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). In the absence of sound formal institutions of contract 
enforcement, businesses in transition employ informal relational mechanisms of governance 
based on trust. Though the importance of such trust-based relations for firms in transition 
economies is emphasized in a significant number of academic papers its affect on economic 
performance of firms remains relatively unstudied. Do firms that rely on trust in dealing with 
their partners are better off than firms that don’t trust their partners?  Despite its importance 
there is no empirical answer to this question to the moment. One of the reasons of the lack of 
empirical studies of this problem is the methodological difficulty related to determination of the 
causal link between trust-based governance and business performance. 
The present paper seeks to fill this gap by exploring the effects of trust-based relations 
on business performance of firms in transition economies. To overcome the methodological 
problem of the causality identification, propensity score matching techniques (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983) is employed in the paper. The results of this study are intended to improve the 
understanding of the consequences of trust-based relations for the business performance of 
firms in transition economies, and thus they extend the existing theoretical framework.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the existing literature 
in the fields of research related to trust-based relationships. Based on the literature review, the 
research hypothesis is formulated. In section 3 we turn to a discussion of the research 
methodology, including empirical strategy and measures. The data set and characteristics of 
variables used in the study are described in section four. The fifth section provides analysis into 
the study results. The final remarks are presented in section 6. 
 
 
2. Literature Review. 
The key element of informal or relational governance is the trust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). 
The concept of trust that underlies relational contractual arrangements is based on social norms 
and personal relations (Lewis, 1985). Heide and John (1992) show that norms play a very 
important role in structuring economically efficient relationships between independent firms. 
They argue that supportive norms have significant economic value when specific assets need to 
be safeguarded. Mitigating possibility for opportunistic behavior and reducing uncertainty, trust 
reduces pressure toward vertical integration (Granovetter, 1985). Macaulay (Macaulay, 1963) 
in his preliminary study of non-contractual relations in business found that the norms of 
keeping commitments impose obligations on parties to transactions at the cost of damaging 
personal relationships. Arrow emphasizing the role of trust as a control mechanism defines it as 
"…an important lubricant of a social system" (Arrow, 1974; p. 23). He states that "…In the 
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absence of trust, it would become very costly to arrange for alternative sanctions and 
guarantees, and many opportunities deriving from mutually beneficial cooperation would have 
to be forgone." (Arrow, 1969; p. 62). The role of informal trust-based institutions takes on 
special significance for firms operating in transition economies. Such institutions allow firms to 
cope with the issues of high transaction costs, uncertainty and scarce information in dealing 
with their partners and thus facilitate smooth functioning of the economies in transition. 
The performance of trust-based informal institutions in transition economies has been 
explored in a number of studies. Raiser, Allan and Steves (2004) based on the data from a large 
survey of firms across 26 transition countries examine the determinants of trust in the transition 
process. Using ‘the level of prepayment demanded by suppliers from their customers in 
advance of delivery’ as a proxy for trust they confirm earlier findings that trust is higher where 
firms have confidence in third party enforcement through the legal system. Other findings of 
the study can be summarized as follows: the fairness and honesty of the courts are a more 
important determinant of inter-firm trust as compared to the courts’ efficiency or ability to 
enforce decisions; networks based around personal ties – family and friends – and business 
associations are important determinants of the development of trust, while business networks 
based on enterprise insiders and government agencies are not; country-level effects are 
significantly more important factors of inter-firm trust than are firm-level effects. Berulava and 
Lezhava (2008) using data from a sample of Georgian manufacturing enterprises find that trust 
along with traditional dimensions of transaction cost economics (asset specificity and 
uncertainty) has a significant impact on the choice of exchange governance mode. They 
discovered that trust produced by informal institutions such as networks comprised from 
friends and relatives as well as from business associations play important role in facilitating 
relationships between manufacturers and distributors in Georgia. Steer and Sen (2010) study 
the role of informal and formal institutions behind the growth of private sector in Vietnam. 
They show that firms have increasingly taken on risks in their transactions in spite of weak 
formal institutions. According to the results of the study, informal institutions remain important 
as mechanisms of risk management even as the economy matures and new formal institutions 
gradually develop. 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) examining trade credit issues in Vietnam find that in a 
weak contract enforcement environment, informal institutions serve as a substitute to a legal 
system. In particular, business network formed by relatives or friends functions as important 
source of information, thus generating trust and promoting exchange.  Similarly, the survey of 
managers of privately-owned manufacturing firms in Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia and Romania 
provides evidence that relationship contracting works as a substitute for the courts (Johnson, 
McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). The same time, the authors find that though relational 
contracting was the basis of the most transactions in all of the countries, the law also did 
matter.  The study results suggest that information from other economic agents, long period of 
cooperation and high switching costs support trade credit.  
Though trust–based relational contracting is generally viewed as substitutes for complex 
contracts in interorganizational exchanges, there is some evidence that formal contracts and 
relational governance function as complements (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Using data from a 
sample of information service exchanges, Poppo and Zenger (2002) find empirical support for 
the proposition that formal and informal relations complement each other.  
The importance of informal trust-based transaction governance mechanisms for firms in 
transition economies has been emphasized also in number of recent studies. Zheng Zhou, 
Poppo and Yang (2008) on the basis of the analysis of 361 buyer-supplier exchanges indicates 
that managers rely more on relational ties as asset specificity and uncertainty increase and that 
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impersonal institutions govern market transactions. Nguyen and Liem (2013) investigate the 
sources of inter-firm trust in order to give a basement for building inter-firm trust. Based on 
disciplines such as relationship marketing, social exchange theory, management authors 
formulate the conceptual model to facilitate trust between partners in inter-firm relationships 
intentionally. The study of Wang et al. (2013) drawing on the information processing view, 
resource-based view, and transaction cost theory, explicates how buyer performance can result 
from buyer's use of relation-specific information processing solutions and supplier's relational 
responses. The authors find that as buyers and suppliers utilize the IT and relational solutions, 
they induce relation-specific responses represented as supplier's business process investments 
and modification flexibility, which in turn lead to positive buyer outcomes. Wang and Yang 
(2013) explore antecedents of inter-firm opportunism and the process variables that mediate the 
relationship between inter-firm opportunism and organizational performance. The study reveals 
that goal congruence has the largest influence on inter-firm opportunism, followed by cultural 
sensitivity, communication, and environmental volatility, norms, governance emphasis, and 
relative dependence. The authors find that inter-firm opportunism affects organizational 
performance through a mediating process including commitment, functional conflict, overall 
satisfaction, and trust. Lavie et al (2012) on the basis of the analysis of non-equity alliances in 
the information technology industry examine performance implications of alliance partners' 
organizational differences and demonstrate how these effects are mediated by relational 
mechanisms. 
 Summarizing, the existing research reveals that trust-based contracting can work as a 
substitute or complement for legal institutions, thus reducing transaction costs and facilitating 
exchange between firms. However, the same time the literature acknowledges that such type of 
relationships can cause some inefficiency in firm’s performance as well.  For instance, 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) argue that informal relationships come with efficiency costs, 
since better exchange opportunities from economic agents outside of the network could be lost. 
Similarly, according to Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (1999), relational contracting along 
with aiding contract can bring some inefficiency. Thus the question of interest is the net result 
of the trust-based relation’s affect on the business performance. Are firms better off when they 
are engaged in informal relations with partners or the opposite statement is true?  
 Despite its importance, to the moment the overall impact of informal contract 
relationships on the firm’s performance remains relatively unstudied in economic literature. 
The existing studies of trust-based relations focus mainly on exploration of its determinants and 
various types of governance structures, while economic consequences of such relationship 
received very sparse attention from academicians. The lack of the interest from academicians to 
the empirical studies of the link between relational contracting and firm’s performance can be 
explained by the distinctive emphasis within existing relevant theories as well as by 
methodological difficulties. According to Sako (2002) the functionalist approach of transaction 
cost economics (TCE) paradigm shifts attentions of researchers from outcomes of relational 
contracting to its determinants. She states that according to TCE researchers “…whatever 
governance structure exists is best for the organization given its environment and 
circumstances.” (Sako, 2002; p.93)  Notwithstanding of the above arguments, we believe that 
the identification of whether the trust-based contracting represents the best governance option 
for firms in transition economies still is topical. This paper aims to shed light on exactly this 
issue by exploring the effect of trust-based relations on various indicators of firm’s 
performance in transition economies. In particular the main research question of the paper is as 
follows 
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 Do firms employing trust-based relations perform better in terms of productivity, 
innovations, and sales than firms not relying on such institutions?   
 
To get the answer on this question, first of all let’s consider the ways in which trust-
based relationships can improve firm’s functioning. Sako (2002) emphasizes three mechanisms 
through which trust may enhance business performance. First, trust-based relationship allows 
for reducing of transaction costs and thus it ensures the most efficient governance structure. 
Second, trust stimulates investments in specific assets, which in turn guarantees future returns 
and productivity growth. Third, trust encourages orientation towards joint problem solving in 
such matters as cost reduction, innovation, management promoting thus continuous learning 
and enhancement. Based on the empirical study of automotive industry in Japan and USA the 
author shows that supplier’s trust of customers generally is associated with its better 
performance in terms of costs, profit margins, just-in-time (JIT) delivery and joint problem 
solving (Sako, 2002). Similarly, Dyer (1996) based on the results of his empirical study, 
emphasizes asset co-specialization and lower transaction costs (which are outcomes of trust-
based hybrid/alliance governance structures) among the factors that provide Japanese 
automotive firms with competitive advantage over their U.S counterparts.  
Helper and Sako (1995) examine the links between trust-based relationship and 
business performance. The authors show that long-term, closely linked relationships have 
performance advantages for automakers and their suppliers in both the United State and Japan. 
Dyer and Wujin Chu (2003) in their study of the relationship between supplier trust in the 
buyer and transaction costs and information sharing in supplier-automaker exchange 
relationships in the U.S., Japan, and Korea, find that perceived trustworthiness reduces 
transaction costs and is correlated with greater information sharing in supplier-buyer 
relationships. The authors argue that trust is unique as a governance mechanism because it not 
only minimizes transaction costs, but also has a mutually causal relationship with information 
sharing which also creates value in the exchange relationship. The relational contracting proved 
its efficiency in transition economic environment as well. Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman 
(1998) in their study of transactional strategies of Russian enterprises found that during 
transition, strategies that use trust have a critical importance as well as personal relationships. 
 Based on the review of the results of existing studies, the research hypothesis of the 
paper can be formulated as follows: employing informal trust-based relations improves 
overall performance of firms in transition economies. 
It worth to mention, that though the existing empirical studies reveal positive 
association between informal relationships and firm’s performance they say nothing about the 
casual link between these variables. Is trust a cause of a better business performance? Or is the 
reverse causation true. This question remains unanswered to the moment. Among the 
methodological issues mentioned above, the problem of identification of the direction of the 
causal link between trust-based relations and business performance is a prominent one. Exactly 
this methodological problem explains for the most part why this link remains relatively 
unstudied to the moment. In this paper we plan to overcome the problem of identification of the 
casual link between trust-based relations and business performance by employing propensity 
score matching procedure (PSM)  (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Our empirical strategy is 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
3. Methodology. 
In this section we describe the empirical strategy and the measures employed in the study. 
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Empirical Strategy. The main objective of the current research is to test theoretical 
hypothesis on the impact of informal trust-based relationships on the business performance of 
firms in transition economies. In this study we use trade credit as a proxy for trust-based 
governance. As it was mentioned above, one of the key econometric problems when estimating 
the effects of trade credit (i.e. trust-based governance) on the business performance is the 
causality issue. The PSM techniques employed in this study, allows us to delineate the casual 
effects of trade credit on business outcomes. This method imitates a controlled experiment and 
assumes creation of a counterfactual that is similar to the treated population by matching them 
on a variety of variables in order to control for observable differences. For instance, the 
counterfactual question of the study can be formulated as follows: “What would have happened 
to the firms which, in fact, did receive ‘treatment’ (in our case the firms that trust their partners 
through providing them trade credit), if they had not received ‘treatment’ (no trust)?” The 
advantage of this approach is that it facilitates identification of the direction of causality 
between variables of interest.  
Our empirical strategy implies implementation of a number of consecutive steps. At the 
first stage we calculate propensity scores, to account for non-randomness in which firms 
provide trade credit. The propensity score allows coping with the issue of selection bias by 
comparing groups based on observed covariates and thus it represents a good tool for 
estimation the treatment effect when treatment assignment is not random. Propensity scores are 
estimated using the following logit regression for the probability that a firm gives trade credit 
(trusts) to its partner: 
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where iy  is i firm’s choice of the mode of relationship with partners ( 1iy if firms provides 
trade credit to its partner and 0iy  otherwise); xi is a set of observed covariates (discussed in 
more detail in the next section); 
'
  – vector of parameters to be estimated.  
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), comparing firms with a similar probability 
of providing trade credit given the observables in xi is equivalent to comparing firms with 
similar values of xi.  Thus after calculation of propensity scores, on the next step, the actual 
matching procedure is conducted. In particular the “kernel” matching technique is employed in 
this study. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for maximum use of all the 
observations. Based on propensity scores the matching procedure implies estimation of a 
counterfactual for each treated observation. 
Assuming that the effect of residual factors on treatment assignment net of treatment 
propensity is ignorable, we can calculate the expected casual effect of the treatment (providing 
trade credit) on the performance of firm. This effect is known as average treatment effects for 
the treated (ATT). The ATT measures the effect of providing trade credit on the outcome 
variable for those firms that actually provided trade credit compared with what would have 
happened if they had not relied on trust-based relations with partners (no trade credit). For 
individual firm the average treatment effect on the treated can be calculated in the following 
way: 
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where 1iq - is potential output of firm i, which is exposed to treatment (firm provides trade 
credit); 0iq - is potential output of firm i, which represents a control group not exposed to 
treatment (firm doesn’t provide trade credit). 
To check the robustness of obtained results the balance check of covariates and 
sensitivity analysis are assumed in the study. 
 
Measures. To explore the potential impact of trust-based relations (providing of trade 
credit) on firm’s performance, a number of outcome variables are used in this study for which 
the corresponding ATT are identified. These outcome variables reflect various aspects of firm’s 
performance and are constructed in a different ways. These variables are: 
Sales Growth – dichotomous variable is coded as 1 if over the last 36 months a firm 
experienced increase in sales and is coded as 0 otherwise.  
Innovation – normalized factor score, which reflects innovative activities undertaken by 
a firm during the last 36 months. Following Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright (2004) we use 
principal component factor analysis to construct this variable from the following four 
innovation variables: developing successfully a major new product line/service; upgrading an 
existing product line/service; creating a new joint venture with foreign partner; obtained a new 
quality accreditation (ISO 9000, 9002 or 14,000, AGCCP, etc). The results of the factor 
analysis are provided in the Appendix (Tables A1.1-A1.5). In addition to the factor score we 
use two dichotomous variables which reflect whether the firm has developed successfully a 
major new product line/service and upgraded an existing product line/service respectively. 
Percentage of Reinvestment – is measured as percentage of total profits reinvested in a 
firm. 
Labor Productivity – this variable is measured as a logarithm of the ratio of sales 
volume (in USD) to a number of full-time employees. 
The dependent variable in the logit regression – Trade Credit – is a dichotomous 
variable constructed from the continuous variable which reflects the percentage of firm’s sales’ 
to customers over the last 12 months that were sold on credit. The variable is coded as 1 if more 
than ten percent of sales were sold on credit and coded as 0 otherwise. 
The choice of covariates, used in calculation of propensity scores, is based on the 
theoretical framework and the existing literature (Raiser, Allan and Steves, 2004; Johnson, 
McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright, 2004). However, only limited 
number of variables are used this study in order to avoid the violation of the common support 
assumption. These variables are assumed to influence both the decision to provide trade credit 
and firm’s performance.  
First, following Raiser, Allan and Steves (2004) we include variables that reflect 
existing legal system and networks.  
Legal System – is constructed on the basis of principal components factor analysis using 
five questions, each employing 6-point scale. The respondents were asked about how often they 
associate the following descriptions with the court system in resolving business disputes. These 
descriptions are: fair and impartial; honest/uncorrupted; quick; affordable; able to enforce its 
decisions (see the results of the factor analysis in the Appendix: Tables A2.1-A2.5). 
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Factor analysis was used in construction of Network variables as well (see Appendix: Tables 
3.1-A3.5).  Initially network variables were measured in the following way. On a 5-point scale 
ranging from extremely important =5 to not important =1 respondents rated the importance of 
the following sources of information on new customers: family and friends; former employees 
who now work for a potential customer or supplier; prior employment of managers by a 
potential customer or supplier current distributors; existing customers or suppliers; government 
agencies, business associations and other sources. Similar to Berulava and Lezhava (2008) 
study, factor solution suggest on existing of the two types of network variables: 
Narrow Networks – include information from narrow group of people such as family 
and friends; former employees who now work for a potential customer or supplier; prior 
employment of managers by a potential customer or supplier current distributors; existing 
customers or suppliers. 
Broad Networks – include information from a broader group of sources such as 
government agencies, business associations and other sources. Other controls employed in the 
study are: 
Internal Funds/Working Capital – percentage of firm’s working capital financed from 
internal funds or retained earnings. 
  Internal Funds/Working Capital - percentage of firm’s new fixed investment financed 
from internal funds or retained earnings. Both variables serve as proxies for capital market 
constraints (Raiser, Allan and Steves, 2004). 
Customer Change - dummy variable for whether firm has changed its major customer in 
last 3 years. 
Payment Delay - dummy variable for whether firms have ever experienced an overdue 
payment. 
Sales to Government - percentage of domestic sales to government. 
Sales to Multinationals - percentage of domestic sales to multinational companies 
located in host country. 
New Firm - dummy variable for whether firms are newly established entities. 
Competition – measures degree of competition using the number of competitors 
reported by the respondent in the market for its main product. Based on the answers, three 
dummy variables are created: no competitors; 1-3 competitors; more than 3 competitors.  
Following Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright (2004) we incorporate three additional 
variables that influence decision of firm to innovate in the models that estimate the effect of 
trade credit on innovation decisions of firm. These variables reflect the importance for firms 
while they make their decisions on the developing new products or services and markets of 
each of the following factors:  
 Domestic Competitors;  
 Foreign Competitors;  
 Customers.  
 
Industry / country controls are also used in the study. 
 
 
4. Data Description. 
The main source of the data for the research is the micro-level dataset from the Enterprise 
Surveys program (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) III 
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round)
1
. The survey was conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the World Bank Group (the World Bank) for 9,655 firms in 28 countries in the 
European and Central Asian region in 2005. In all countries where a reliable sample frame was 
available, the sample was selected using stratified random sampling. Three levels of 
stratification were used in all countries: industry, establishment size and region. The more 
detailed description of the sampling methodology can be found in the Sampling Manual
2
. 
Table 1, presents a description of the key variables used in the study. According to the 
data from this table, out of 9,655 observations, fifty four percent of firms reported improvement 
of their performance in terms of sales growth over the last 36 months.  On average almost half 
of the profit earned by the firms in the sample was reinvested in firms. Another important 
dimension of firm’s performance used in the study is innovation. According to table 1, over the 
period of last three years almost thirty five percent of firms introduced a new product line, half 
of the sample upgraded existing product, more than twelve percent obtained a new quality 
accreditation ISO, and only four percent of firms opened a new plant. The average rate of labor 
productivity for the sample (out of 6,984 observations) is approximately thirty six thousands of 
USD per employee. Trade credit as a mean of relationships with the partners is employed by a 
half of the firms in the sample (out of 9,595 observations).  
The evaluation of the legal system reveals that ability of court to enforce its decisions 
received the highest rating, while its affordability and quickness the lowest. Among the 
network sources of information existing customers/suppliers have the highest level of 
credibility. Government agencies and business associations are the least trusted sources of 
information on business partners.  
Almost half of the firms in the sample have ever experienced an overdue payment and 
about twenty two percent have changed a major customer in last three years. The share of sales 
to government and multinationals doesn’t exceed five percent each. Around seventy percent of 
working capital and new fixed investments is financed from the internal funds. 
New firms represent approximately eighty percent of the sample. Most of the firms 
(70.1 %) encounter intense competition (facing with more than three competitors), while about 
twenty four percent of firms have only 1-3 rivals. Only six percent of firms reported that they 
have no rivals. According to table 1, pressure from domestic rivals and from customers is the 
most important incentive of innovation for the firms in the sample. The threat from the foreign 
rivals seems to be less important stimulus for innovation.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Number of 
observations 
Sales growth  .540 .50 9,655 
New product line  .349 .48 9,655 
Upgrade of existing products  .502 .50 9,655 
Opening a new facility  .042 .20 9,655 
Obtained a new quality accreditation ISO  .125 .33 9,655 
Reinvestment of profits (percent) 49.530 40.07 7,781 
Labor productivity (thousands of USD) 35.859 160.81 6,984 
Trade credit  .500 .50 9,595 
Court: fair/honest 2.923 1,37 8,339 
Court: quick/affordable 2.760 1.23 8,418 
                                                          
1 https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
2 http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Methodology/Sampling_Note.pdf 
 
10 
 
Court: can enforce its decisions 3.363 1.52 8,665 
Information about customer: Family and friends 2.507 1.38 9,461 
Information about customer: Former employees/ managers 2.303 1.17 9,136 
Information about customer: Existing customers or suppliers 3.414 1.30 9,369 
Information about customer: Government agencies 2.200 1.35 9,242 
Information about customer: Business associations 2.154 1.31 9,246 
Information about customer: Trade fairs/others 2.746 1.42 9,320 
Payment delay  .504 .50 9,655 
Change of major customer  .218 .41 9,655 
Sales to government (percent) 4.259 14.35 9,327 
Sales to multinational corporations (percent) 3.925 13,72 9,327 
Working capital financed from internal funds (percent) 72.270 37.39 9,430 
New fixed investments financed from internal funds (percent) 70.136 39.85 6,836 
New firm .793 .41 8,806 
No competitor  .060 .24 8,411 
One-to-three competitors .239 .43 8,411 
More than three competitors .701 .46 8,411 
Pressure from domestic competitors: not at all important .136 .34 9,526 
Pressure from domestic competitors: slightly important .187 .39 9,526 
Pressure from domestic competitors: fairly important .347 .48 9,526 
Pressure from domestic competitors: very important .330 .47 9,526 
Pressure from foreign competitors: not at all important .459 .50 9,212 
Pressure from foreign competitors: slightly important .182 .39 9,212 
Pressure from foreign competitors: fairly important .190 .39 9,212 
Pressure from foreign competitors: very important .169 .37 9,212 
Pressure from customers: not at all important .121 .33 9,466 
Pressure from customers: slightly important .158 .36 9,466 
Pressure from customers: fairly important .337 .47 9,466 
Pressure from customers: very important .385 .49 9,466 
 
Table 2 presents a comparison of firms that provide trade credit to their partners with 
those that don’t, with respect to the outcome variables used in the study. Estimation of the 
mean differences was performed using cross-tabulation for bivariate output variables, and one-
way ANOVA for  the continuous variables.  
 
Table 2.  Comparison performance outcomes of the firm with and without trade credit (in 
percent) 
Output variables Trade 
Credit  
No 
Trade 
Credit  
Difference 
Pearson ch.sq. 
(df) 
F-stat. (df) 
Sales growth  56.5 51.6 23.679(1)*** - 
New product line  39.4 30.4 84.963(1)*** - 
Upgrade of existing products  55.1 45.5 88.408(1)*** - 
Opening a new facility  4.6 3.8 3.948(1)** - 
Obtained a new quality accreditation ISO  15.9 9.1 100.75(1)*** - 
Reinvestment of profits  55.3 43.8 - 162.92 (1)*** 
Labor productivity(in thousands of USD) 43.67 27.4 - 17.74 (1)*** 
*** — statistically significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — statistically significant at p < 0.05 level; * — statistically 
significant at p < 0.1 level. 
 
According to the table 2, firms that employ on trust-based relations with partners 
perform much better compared to those that don’t trust their customers on all performance 
indicators. In particular, higher proportion of firms that provide trade credits experienced sales 
growth over the last 36 months; they reinvest higher proportions of profits in their businesses. 
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Firms that trust their partners innovate more in terms of introducing new product lines and 
plants, upgrading existing products and adopting new quality standards; they have higher labor 
productivity level as well. All results are statistically significant at one or five percent 
significance levels. 
However, this kind of analysis reflects only unconditional differences in performance 
between two types of firms. To say distinctly, the data provided in table 2 indicates just on how 
trust-based relations are associated with performance outcomes of the firms. Due to non-
random selection of trade credit, one cannot ascertain whether the trade credit has a casual 
effect on firms’ performance from this analysis. To explore the casual link between trust-based 
relations and firms performance we employ a propensity score matching techniques, which 
allows for dealing with non-random selection issue. The results of this analysis are discussed in 
the next section.  
 
5. Study Results. 
In this section, we discuss the empirical results of the study. First, using logit regression we 
predict firm’s choice of giving a trade credit to a partner and on the basis of this analysis the 
propensity score is calculated. Next, based on the calculated propensity scores, the matching 
procedure is conducted and the impact of trade credit on performance outcomes is measured. 
Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the study results is performed to check their robustness. 
Trade Credit Prediction. The dependent variable in our logit regressions is 
dichotomous, which reflects whether or not firm provides trade credit to its partner. Propensity 
scores are calculated separately for each of six outcome variables
3
. Since three innovation 
variables share the same model we have results of four logit regressions presented in Table 3. 
The explanatory power of the all regression is quite satisfactory since all models are 
statistically significant at one percent level and pseudo R² are above 10%.  
  As it was expected the broad networks comprised from business associations and 
government agencies has a positive and statistically significant (at p<0.001 level) impact on the 
probability of providing trade credits. Surprisingly narrow networks (friends and family 
members; customers and suppliers; former employee and managers) have opposite effect on the 
choice variable to what one would have expected. The same is true for legal system variable 
which reflects efficiency and reliability of the courts, though this result is not statistically 
significant. Other control variables show more or less expected results. 
The Impact of Trade Credit on Business Performance. The kernel matching procedure 
for estimation of average treatment effect is used to identify the impact of the trust-based 
relationships (trade credit) on the business performance in this study. We first analyze how well 
balanced are the covariates employed in the study. The data necessary for balance checking is 
provided in the appendix (Table A4). According to the table A4, t-tests for equality of means in 
the treated and non-treated groups after matching are non significant for all covariates. Also the 
standardized bias after matching is less than 5% for all variables, indicating on good balancing 
of the data. 
To ensure the common support assumption we removed all treatment observations 
whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score 
of the controls. The number of ‘off support’ observations dropped from the four models 
employed in our study is negligible (see Appendix: Table A5). 
 
 
                                                          
3
 STATA command psmatch2 is used for this purpose. 
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Table 3. Trade Credit Logit Regression Results  
Dependent variable: trade credit/no trade credit 
Covariates Models with outcome variables: 
Sales growth Labor 
productivity  
Percentage of 
reinvestment  
Innovation 
Legal system -.196   
 (.166) 
-.169   
 (.204) 
-.135    
(.182) 
-.234 
(.170) 
Narrow networks -.113***  
(.036) 
-.099**   
(.042) 
-.087** 
(.040) 
-.129***  
(.038) 
Broad networks .155***  
(.036) 
.151***   
(.042) 
.143***  
  (.039) 
.109***   
(.037) 
Internal funds/working capital -.003**   
(.001) 
-.003**   
(.001) 
-.004***   
(.001) 
-.002**   
(.001) 
Internal funds/new fixed investment -.002*   
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.002**   
(.001) 
Payment delay 1.060***  
(.075) 
1.020***   
(.087) 
1.016***   
(.081) 
1.055***   
(.076) 
Service -.449***  
(.074) 
-.462***   
(.087) 
-.458***   
(.080) 
-.407***   
(.076) 
New .019   
(.094) 
.121    
(.106) 
-.009 
(.104) 
.010 
(.096) 
Sales to government -.003    
(.002) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.002) 
Sales to multinationals .011***    
(.002) 
.010***   
(.003) 
.011*** 
(.002) 
- 
Customer change .205**  
(.083) 
.156    
(.096) 
.075 
(.091) 
- 
Competition_1 (no competitors) -.094   
 (.180) 
-.050    
(.202) 
-.033 
(.196) 
-.075 
(.189) 
Competition_2 (1-3 competitors) .061    
(.083) 
.135 
(.097) 
.125 
(.090) 
.141 
(.085) 
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pressure from domestic competitors_1 - - - -.166 
(.148) 
Pressure from domestic competitors_2 - - - -.307*** 
(.117) 
Pressure from domestic competitors_3 - - - -.151 
(.093) 
Pressure from foreign competitors_1 - - - -.555***   
(.115) 
Pressure from foreign competitors_2 - - - -.276**   
(.127) 
Pressure from foreign competitors_3 - - - -.178 
(.126) 
Pressure from customers_1 - - - .092 
(.156) 
Pressure from customers_2 - - - .076 (.118) 
Pressure from customers_3 - - - .219**  
(.090) 
Model fit 
LR chi2(df) 861.05 (38) 660.23 (37)  740.32 (38) 862.64 (46) 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1498 0.1560 0.1504 0.1547 
Number of observations 4154 3071 3557 4029 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses;   
*** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 level. 
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According to the table 4, in support to the main hypothesis of the study, we find that in 
general, trade credit improves business performance of companies. In particular, trust-based 
relations (trade credit) tend to increase sales of firms. The difference for treated and control 
groups is above six percentage points and is statistically significant at the one percent level. 
Trust-based relations stimulate innovative behavior as well. The effect of trade credit on firms 
innovation is statistically significant at p<0.05 level
4
. This is especially true for the successful 
development of a major new product line/service and upgrading of an existing product 
line/service. Firms that trust to their partners invest more in their business. The share of 
reinvested profits is higher by six percent for the firms that provide trade credit to partners 
(statistically significant at one percent level). These firms are also more productive in terms of 
labor productivity compared to firms that don’t rely on trust (significant at p<0.01 level).  
 
Table 4. Estimated Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT) for Trade Credit  
ATT Outcome variables 
Sales 
growth 
Labor 
productivity 
Percentage of 
reinvestment 
Innovation 
(factor 
score) 
Introducing 
new product 
Upgrading 
existing 
product 
Treated .60603   3.36259    56.40054   .29577    .43965      .60530   
Controls .54070    3.15469    50.47600    .27432    .38076 .55745    
Difference .06532***    .20789***        5.92454***   .02145**  .05889**  .04785***    
Standard 
Error 
.01938     .04809 1.64058     .00980      .02007     .02068     
T-statistic 3.37 4.32 3.61 2.19 2.93 2.31 
Notes: *** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 level. 
 
Generally, the results of ATT estimation, obtained from kernel matching estimation 
procedure coincides with unconditional matching outcomes discussed in the previous section. 
However, the ATT estimation present more precise results and allow for identification of 
causality direction. 
Sensitivity Analysis. In this study the significant effect of trust-based relations (trade 
credit) on firm’s performance is found on the basis of propensity score matching procedure. 
However, since PSM cannot control for unobservable characteristics, the question is whether 
these results are robust to unobservable variables. To say distinctly, an unmeasured 
confounding variable may impact selection into the treatment and thus undermine the 
conclusions. To find how strongly ‘hidden biases’ might affect the results of the study we 
employ sensitivity analysis proposed by Rosenbaum (2002). Since the outcome variables of 
different nature (both dichotomous and continuous) are used in this study, we apply two 
alternative procedures of sensitivity analysis: Hodges-Lehmann point estimates
5
 (DiPrete and 
Gangl, 2004) for continuous variables and Mantel and Haenszel (1959)
6
 test statistic for 
discrete ones (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). The results of sensitivity analysis presented in 
tables 5 and 6 show that robustness to hidden bias varies significantly across the different 
outcomes. 
Table 5 reports the Hodges-Lehmann point estimates results for continuous outcome 
variables: innovation (factor score); percent of reinvestment and labor productivity. These 
results show that the outcomes under consideration are sensitive to potential impact of 
unobservable variables. For reinvestment and labor productivity outcome variables, the 
                                                          
4
 The negative sign is due to reverse coding of the raw innovation variables. 
5
 Stata command: rbounds 
6
 Stata command: mhbounds 
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Hodges-Lehmann point estimates encompass zero at gamma=1.5 and gamma= 1.7 respectively. 
These values mean that the unobserved characteristic would have to increase the odds ratio by 
less than 50% and 70% respectively before it would bias the estimated impact. The situation is 
even worse with respect to innovation variable, the treatment effect becomes insignificant at 
gamma=1.1. These relatively low values (less than critical value of 2) imply that the treatment 
effects for reinvestment, labor productivity and especially for innovation are sensitive to 
unobserved characteristics. Thus some caution is needed when interpreting the results based on 
these findings. 
 
Table 5. Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis: Hodges-Lehmann point estimates for 
variable Trade Credit 
Outcome 
variables 
Gamma* Significance level Hodges-Lehmann point 
estimate 
Confidence interval 
(95%) 
upper 
bound 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
lower 
bound 
Innovation 
(factor score) 
1         .039688    .039688    .011511    .011511    -.00089    .024168 
1.1         .556352    .000129   -.000593    .023821    -.00795    .034481 
1.2         .969456    3.4e-08   -.006949    .032859   -.016587      .0474 
1.3         .999738    1.2e-12   -.014305    .044614   -.026727    .057475 
1.4                       1 0   -.023525    .054505   -.032436    .065984 
1.5                       1 0   -.030376    .062149   -.039059    .074346 
1.6                     1 0   -.035184    .069965   -.045978    .081305 
1.7                       1 0   -.041526    .077077   -.052382    .086434 
1.8                      1 0   -.04762    .082586   -.058048    .092908 
1.9                      1 0   -.053162    .087132   -.063492    .100064 
2.0 1 0   -.058143    .093047   -.069299    .105434 
Labor 
productivity 
1         0             0 .236014    .236014    .192472    .279169 
1.1         0             0 .19869    .273084    .155112    .316232 
1.2         4.3e-13 0 .164651    .306743    .120728    .350033 
1.3         3.8e-09 0 .133374    .337708    .088928    .381133 
1.4                       3.2e-06 0 .104324     .36609    .059458    .409722 
1.5                       .000413 0 .077101    .392606    .032222    .436286 
1.6                     .012154 0 .051859     .41715    .006847    .461038 
1.7                       .109546 0 .028206    .440235   -.017279    .484071 
1.8                      .395415 0 .006112    .461703   -.040144    .505904 
1.9                      .740909 0 -.014978    .482001   -.061703    .526836 
2.0 .934632 0 -.035224    .501179   -.082063    .546281 
Percentage of 
reinvestment 
1         1.1e-16    1.1e-16    5.34297    5.34297    3.77527    6.46069 
1.1         7.3e-11 0 3.92317     6.3305    2.45332    8.02064 
1.2         7.5e-07 0 2.72005    7.68218    1.45339    9.67885 
1.3         .000405 0 1.71697    9.11178    .752616    10.8417 
1.4                       .022713 0 1.01281      10.45    .030805    11.9178 
1.5                       .227328 0 .437799    11.2935    -1.0688    13.5442 
1.6                     .664071 0 -.337541    12.4413   -2.10398    15.1517 
1.7                       .936273 0 -1.32086    13.9492   -3.14728    16.0382 
1.8                      .994814 0 -2.24069    15.2914   -3.91679    17.2543 
1.9                      .999806 0 -3.15281    16.0447   -4.55536    19.0195 
2.0 .999996 0 -3.83573    17.1031   -5.35743    20.3552 
Note: * - gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
 
The results of sensitivity analysis for discrete variables - sales growth, introduction of 
new product line and upgrading existing products – are presented in Table 6. According to the 
Table 6, the average treatment effect is statistically significant even at high levels of gamma. 
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This means that the average treatment effect estimated for these output variables are insensitive 
and robust to the presence of hidden bias. 
 
Table 6. Mantel-Haenszel bounds sensitivity analysis for variable Trade Credit 
Outcome 
variables 
Gamma* Mantel-Haenszel statistic Significance level 
overestimation 
of treatment 
effect 
underestimation 
of treatment effect 
overestimation 
of treatment 
effect 
underestimation 
of treatment effect 
Sales growth 1 2.59199    2.59199    .004771    .004771 
2 8.32586    13.6621 0 0 
3 14.8527    20.3319 0 0 
4 19.5811    25.2127 0 0 
5 23.3252    29.1111 0 0 
6 26.4452    32.3851 0 0 
7 29.1326    35.2259 0 0 
Introducing a 
new product 
1 5.82678    5.82678    2.8e-09    2.8e-09 
2 4.79182    16.7106    8.3e-07          0 
3 11.0985    23.3149 0 0 
4 15.6576    28.1623 0 0 
5 19.2689     32.038 0 0 
6 22.2835    35.2928 0 0 
7 24.8871    38.1148 0 0 
Upgrading 
existing 
product 
1 5.60945    5.60945    1.0e-08    1.0e-08 
2 5.19933    16.6642    1.0e-07          0 
3 11.6133    23.3612 0 0 
4 16.2355    28.2737 0 0 
5 19.88    32.2016 0 0 
6 22.9057    35.5012 0 0 
7 25.503    38.3633 0 0 
Note: * - gamma  - odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
 
Summarizing, the sensitivity analysis of the impact of trade credit on firm’s 
performance variables shows mixed results. While some output variables are sensitive to 
hidden bias the other are quite robust with respect to potential impact of unobserved 
characteristics. However, one should realize that sensitivity analysis doesn’t reveal the 
existence of hidden biases per se; rather it indicates how the treatment effect can be influenced 
by these biases. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the impact of trust-based relations on firm’s 
performance in transition economies. We use trade credit as a proxy of trust-based relations in 
this study. In particular, the question we seek to address in this study was, “does trade credit to 
customers improve business performance of firms that provide it?” The answer to this question 
may have important implication for the development of best business relation practices for the 
firms in countries in transition. However, an empirical test of this issue has not been 
implemented to the moment because of the complications involved in establishing of a causal 
link between trust-based relations and business performance. We address this problem by using 
propensity score matching method to establish counterfactuals for firms that provide trade 
credit to their customers, and matching these companies with similar firms that don’t trust their 
customers based on characteristics that affect both the probability of choice for providing trade 
credit and business performance outcomes. Specifically, we employed covariates that reflect 
trust of economic agents to the legal system as well as to information provided by networks 
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from friend, relatives, colleagues, partners, business associations and government agencies; 
degree of competition and pressure on the firm to innovate from customers, domestic and 
foreign competitors; variables that reflect experience of the firms in dealing with partners and a 
couple of financial indicators; industry and country controls. The study was conducted using 
data from a large survey of firms across 28 transition economies. 
The main contribution of this study is that it provides new empirical insights into the 
casual link between trust-based relations and business performance of firms in transition 
economies. The results of the study suggest that informal trust-based institutions of contract 
governance represent an important way for enhancing of business performance in transition 
economies. To say distinctly, our findings indicate that in transition economies trade credits 
positively affect the business performance of firms. In particular, trust-based relations are 
associated with increased sales. They provide incentives for more intensive innovation 
activities and ensure higher labor productivity rates. The firms that trust their partners are 
characterized by larger proportions of reinvested profits as well.  The main explanation of these 
findings is that developing of trust among economic agents allows for reduction of transaction 
costs, stimulates learning and continuous improvement; makes incentives for innovative 
activities (Sako, 2002) and thus it helps firms in enhancing of their overall business 
performance. Though, trust-based relations always contain a potential threat of inefficiencies 
that can arise when low-cost new entrant is excluded (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999), our 
results suggest that in the end such relationships are beneficial for firms in transition.  
The data used in the analysis is well-balanced that makes the results of the study more 
reliable. However, the sensitivity test indicates that while the estimated effects of trade credit 
on some indicators of business performance is quite robust, its impacts on the other outcomes 
are rather sensitive to hidden bias. Another limitation of the study is that it employs only one 
proxy for trust-based relations and a limited number of performance outcomes indicators.  
Thus, for the future research, we propose to investigate the casual links between trust-
based relationships and business performance using alternative methods, including instrumental 
variables technique; employing various proxies for trust and diverse outcome variables. This 
will allow to supplement the propensity score matching procedure used in this study and to 
verify the robustness of our findings. 
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APPENDIX. 
 
Table A1.1. Innovation: Correlation Matrix 
 Developing 
successfully a 
major new 
product 
line/service 
Developing 
successfully a 
major new 
product 
line/service 
Upgrading an 
existing 
product 
line/service 
Obtained a new 
quality accreditation 
(ISO 9000, 9002 or 
14,000, AGCCP, 
etc) 
Developing successfully a 
major new product line/service 
1,000 ,428*** ,125*** ,179*** 
Upgrading an existing product 
line/service 
,428*** 1,000 ,119*** ,169*** 
Creating a new joint venture 
with foreign partner 
,125*** ,119*** 1,000 ,122*** 
Obtained a new quality 
accreditation (ISO 9000, 9002 
or 14,000, AGCCP, etc) 
,179*** ,169*** ,122*** 1,000 
Notes: *** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 level. 
 
Table A1.2. Innovation: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,586 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 2659,955 
Degrees of freedom 6 
Significance ,000 
 
Table A1.3. Innovation: Communalities  
 Initial Extraction 
Developing successfully a major new product line/service 1,000 ,653 
Upgrading an existing product line/service 1,000 ,622 
Creating a new joint venture with foreign partner 1,000 ,708 
Obtained a new quality accreditation (ISO 9000, 9002 or 14,000, 
AGCCP, etc) 
1,000 ,540 
  
Table A1.4. Innovation: Total Variance Explained  
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total Percent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
percent 
Total Percent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
percent 
1 1,610 40,258 40,258 1,610 40,258 40,258 
2 ,951 23,786 64,044       
3 ,866 21,657 85,701       
4 ,572 14,299 100,000       
 
Table A1.5. Innovation: Component Matrix  
Variables Component 
1 
Developing successfully a major new product line/service ,770 
Upgrading an existing product line/service ,763 
Creating a new joint venture with foreign partner ,410 
Obtained a new quality accreditation (ISO 9000, 9002 or 14,000, AGCCP, etc) ,518 
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Table A2.1. Legal System: Correlation Matrix 
  
Court fair and 
honest 
Court quick and 
affordable 
Court can enforce 
Court fair and honest 1,000 ,644*** ,543*** 
Court quick and affordable ,644*** 1,000 ,576*** 
Court can enforce ,543*** ,576*** 1,000 
Notes: *** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 
level. 
 
Table A2.2. Legal System: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,707 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 7986,335 
Degrees of freedom 3 
Significance ,000 
 
Table A2.3. Legal System: Communalities  
 Initial Extraction 
Court fair and honest 1,000 ,736 
Court quick and affordable 1,000 ,762 
Court can enforce 1,000 ,678 
 
Table A2.4. Legal System: Total Variance Explained  
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total Percent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
percent 
Total Percent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
percent 
1 2,177 72,551 72,551 2,177 72,551 72,551 
2 ,471 15,694 88,246    
3 ,353 11,754 100,000    
 
Table A2.5. Legal System: Component Matrix  
Variables Component 
1 
Court fair and honest ,858 
Court quick and affordable ,873 
Court can enforce ,824 
 
Table A3.1. Network Variables: Correlation Matrix 
 Family 
and 
friend 
networks 
Employees 
and 
managers 
networks 
Customer/ 
suppliers 
network 
Government 
agencies 
networks 
Business 
associati
ons 
network 
Trade fairs 
/others 
network 
Family and friend 
networks 
1,000 ,475*** ,314*** ,143*** ,206*** ,155*** 
Employees and managers 
networks 
,475*** 1,000 ,378*** ,377*** ,423*** ,326*** 
Customer/ suppliers 
network 
,314*** ,378*** 1,000 ,149*** ,265*** ,322*** 
Government agencies 
networks 
,143*** ,377*** ,149*** 1,000 ,495*** ,271*** 
Business associations 
network 
,206*** ,423*** ,265*** ,495*** 1,000 ,519*** 
Trade fairs /others 
network 
,155*** ,326*** ,322*** ,271*** ,519*** 1,000 
Notes: *** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 level. 
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Table A3.2. Network Variables: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,734 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 11694,514 
Degrees of freedom 15 
Significance ,000 
 
Table A3.3. Network Variables: Communalities  
 Initial Extraction 
Family and friend networks 1,000 ,716 
Employees and managers networks 1,000 ,650 
Customer/ suppliers network 1,000 ,501 
Government agencies networks 1,000 ,580 
Business associations network 1,000 ,739 
Trade fairs /others network 1,000 ,527 
 
Table A3.4. Network Variables: Total Variance Explained  
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total Percent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
percent 
Total Percent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
percent 
1 2,637 43,953 43,953 2,637 43,953 43,953 
2 1,077 17,947 61,899 1,077 17,947 61,899 
3 ,824 13,740 75,640    
4 ,609 10,158 85,798    
5 ,449 7,488 93,286    
6 ,403 6,714 100,000    
 
Table A3.5. Network Variables: RotatedComponent Matrix  
Variables Component 
  
1 2 
  
Family and friend networks -,005 ,846 
  
Employees and managers networks ,417 ,690 
  
Customer/ suppliers network ,194 ,681 
  
Government agencies networks ,759 ,065 
Business associations network ,838 ,191 
Trade fairs /others network ,694 ,211 
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Table A4. Trade Credit’s Effect ATT estimation: Balance Checking 
Covariates Sales growth Labor productivity  Percentage of 
reinvestment  
Innovation 
% 
of 
bias 
t-test % of 
bias 
t-test % of 
bias 
t-test % of 
bias 
t-test 
t p-value t p-value t p-
value 
t p-
value 
Legal system -2.4  -0.79   0.428 -1.2   -0.34   0.734 -2.4  -0.72   0.470 -4.5   -1.46   0.144 
Narrow 
networks 
-3.4  -1.12   0.262 -4.2   -1.22   0.223 -3.2   -0.99 0.324 -3.7   -1.21   0.228 
Broad networks -1.3   -0.43 0.671 -1.6   -0.46   0.643 -1.2   -0.36   0.721 0.4    0.12   0.901 
Internal 
funds/working 
capital 
0.5     0.14   0.885 -0.3   -0.08   0.936 -0.7  -0.21   0.834 -0.4   -0.12   0.908 
Internal 
funds/new fixed 
investment 
1.3     0.40   0.689 0.7    0.20   0.841 -0.7  -0.19   0.848 1.0     0.31   0.754 
Payment delay -0.6    -0.19 0.850 -0.9    -0.28   0.782 0.2    0.08   0.940 0.0     0.01   0.995 
Service 1.5    0.51   0.608 1.1    0.31   0.753 1.1     0.34   0.737 -0.3   -0.09   0.927 
New 1.2    0.38   0.704 2.0    0.59   0.558 1.3     0.39   0.69 0.6     0.20   0.840 
Sales to 
government 
-2.2   -0.77   0.440 -3.5   -1.03   0.305 -2.4   -0.77   0.442 -3.1   -1.05   0.296 
Sales to 
multinationals 
-4.4   -1.24   0.215 -3.8   -0.94   0.349 -6.1  -1.53   0.127 - - - 
Customer 
change 
0.7    0.24   0.813 1.7    0.48   0.633 2.3   0.69   0.490 - - - 
Competition_1 
(no competitors) 
-0.4   -0.12   0.903 -0.1   -0.03   0.979 0.3  0.11   0.912 1.6     0.54   0.586 
Competition_2 
(1-3 
competitors) 
-1.1   -0.37   0.713 -0.4  -0.11   0.911 1.5   0.45   0.656 -1.9   -0.61   0.543 
Pressure from 
domestic 
competitors_1 
- - - - - - - - - -2.6    -0.90   0.367 
Pressure from 
domestic 
competitors_2 
- - - - - - - - - -0.1    -0.04   0.970 
Pressure from 
domestic 
competitors_3 
- - - - - - - - - -0.2    -0.05   0.959 
Pressure from 
foreign 
competitors_1 
- - - - - - - - - -1.2    -0.40   0.690 
Pressure from 
foreign 
competitors_2 
- - - - - - - - - 0.9   0.28   0.780 
Pressure from 
foreign 
competitors_3 
- - - - - - - - - 2.9     0.90   0.370 
Pressure from 
customers_1 
- - - - - - - - - -0.5   -0.17   0.868 
Pressure from 
customers_2 
- - - - - - - - - -4.0    -1.39 0.164 
Pressure from 
customers_3 
- - - - - - - - - -1.5   -0.49   0.623 
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Table A5. Trade Credit: Summary of Units off and on Support  
Dependent Variables Treatment 
Assignment  
Off 
support 
On 
Support 
Total 
Sales growth Untreated 0 1,976 1,976 
Treated 23 2,155 2,178 
Total 23 4,131 4,154 
Labor productivity Untreated 0 1,396 1,396 
Treated 18 1,657 1,675 
Total 18 3,053 3,071 
Percentage of reinvestment Untreated 0 1,698 1,698 
Treated 14 1,845 1,859 
Total 14 3,543 3,557 
Innovation  Untreated 0 1,913 1,913 
Treated 3 2,113 2,116 
Total 3 4,026 4,029 
 
